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On the Economic Architecture of the Workplace: Repercussions of 
Social Comparisons amongst Heterogeneous Workers 
 
Oded Stark, Universities of Bonn, Klagenfurt, and Vienna, Warsaw University, and 
Warsaw School of Economics 
 
Walter Hyll, Halle Institute for Economic Research, and University of Klagenfurt 
 
We analyze the impact on a firm’s profits and optimal wage rates, and on the distribution of 
workers’ earnings, when workers compare their earnings with those of co-workers. We 
consider a low-productivity worker who receives lower wage earnings than a high-
productivity worker. When the low-productivity worker derives (dis)utility not only from his 
own effort but also from comparing his earnings with those of the high-productivity worker, 
his response to the sensing of relative deprivation is to increase the optimal level of effort. 
Consequently, the firm’s profits are higher, its wage rates remain unchanged, and the 
distribution of earnings is compressed.  
 
“Relative success, tested by an invidious pecuniary comparison with other men, 
becomes the conventional end of action. The currently accepted legitimate end of effort 
becomes the achievement of a [less un] favourable comparison with other men [. . .].” 
Thorstein Veblen (1899). 
 
I. Introduction 
There is strong and growing interest in the link between individual behavior and social 
comparisons.1 The recent and evolving research on happiness is a case in point.2 In this paper 
we link social comparisons with incentive structures within firms. To model incentive 
structures properly, it is necessary to understand how workers behave in the presence of 
externalities arising from comparisons with co-workers. Akerlof (1982) explains why firms 
                                                 
1 As early as half a century ago, Festinger (1954) pointed out that humans routinely compare their abilities with 
those of others. More than a century ago, Veblen (1899), as quoted above, intimated that people compare their 
fortunes with those of others and seek to narrow the gap by working harder. 
2 Clark, Frijters, and Shields (2008) review the importance of relative considerations and explain why increasing 
real incomes in developed countries are not perceived to increase average happiness. Knight, Song, and 
Gunatilaka (2007) even find that relative income is more important for individual happiness than actual income. 
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pay wages above the market-clearing level. When workers develop a feeling for their firm, an 
exchange of “gifts” can occur: workers exert more effort than is required, and the firm pays 
wages that are higher than the workers could receive from alternative employers. 
Furthermore, if workers have a fellow feeling towards co-workers, the firm has to treat its 
workers as a group. Fellow feeling towards co-workers yields increased utility when the firm 
“relaxes pressure on the workers who are hard pressed; in return for reducing such pressure, 
better workers are often willing to work harder” (Akerlof 1982, 550). Unlike Akerlof (1982), 
and unlike Levine (1991), we argue that increasing the “pressure” on the less able (less 
productive) workers will induce them to work harder (exert more effort). Our general idea is 
that discontent can arise not only from low earnings but also from earnings lower than those 
of co-workers, and that unfavorable comparisons can induce workers to work harder.3 We 
thus model workers’ behavior in the context of social interactions. We study the links between 
workers’ behavior, the firm’s response, and the workers’ reaction to that response, and we 
trace out the repercussions for profits, earnings compression, and the design of the 
workplace.4 
We assume that workers dislike earning less than fellow workers. We do not consider 
the case in which low-productivity workers dislike high-productivity workers as such (Becker 
1957; Schelling 1971). As in Cabrales, Calvó-Armengol, and Pavoni (2008) we assume that 
discontent arises only from market outcomes. Heterogeneity in levels of productivity gives 
rise to variation in earnings. We show that for reasonable preferences, the sense of relative 
deprivation which arises from a comparison of a low-productivity worker’s earnings with 
those of a high- productivity worker induces more effort: relative deprivation motivates the 
                                                 
3 Frank (1985, 30) intimates that “the evidence we have seen suggests that people’s relative economic standing 
strongly influences the way they feel and act.” 
4 Whereas social comparisons are at the heart of our model, they are not critical to the rank-order tournament 
environment modelled by Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Rosen (1986). In their environment, the engine that 
drives effort is prizes. Workers’ expected income consists of a prize to a winner and a prize to a loser. Workers 
seek to maximise their expected income net of the cost of exerting the effort that yields that income. In our 
model, the engine that drives effort is the higher income of co-workers: workers seek to maximize their expected 
utility net of the cost of exerting effort, where utility is derived from a rise in their own income and a fall in the 
income of the co-workers whose earnings are higher than theirs. While the rank tournament environment is 
applicable to workers comparing themselves to an exogenously set “fixed standard” (Lazear and Rosen 1981, 
848), our model builds on the idea that the effort eliciting comparison is endogenous. It follows that if social 
comparisons were to be incorporated in rank-order tournament models, the workers who sense “relative 
deprivation” (defined below) will be predicted to exert more effort than the workers who do not sense “relative 
deprivation.” It is possible that this omission accounts for the experimental finding of Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt 
(1987) that the rank-order tournament theory under-predicts the effort supplied by the high cost or the 
disadvantaged agents. 
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low-productivity worker to close the earnings gap with the high-productivity worker, and this 
is achieved by exerting more effort.5,6  
In principle, there are (at least) four basic responses to the sensing of discontent or 
dismay from having a wage that is lower than that of others with whom comparisons are 
made: exert more effort, exit (migrate), acquire better skills (enhance productivity), and 
sabotage the performance of others.7  The type of response that is likely to be observed 
depends on individual perceptions and capabilities, the nature of the economic and social 
environment, the set of opportunities, the time frame, and the social and cultural norms. It is 
beyond the scope of the current paper to seek to model an overarching theory of the 
determination of which type of response will be adopted. In particular, in this paper we do not 
cover responses such as skill formation and exit (migration). The former response may not be 
feasible if skills are exogenous (or are very costly to acquire, or can be acquired only in the 
long run). The second response requires an elaboration of alternative environments, the 
modeling of belief structures regarding the behavior of others, and the modeling of costs. We 
do seek, however, to examine closely one type of response - exertion of effort - and link this 
type with the economic design of the firm. Perhaps out of the plethora of responses, a 
modification of effort is the one that a firm can engineer most easily and most swiftly.  
We show that compared to a baseline model (where no relative deprivation is felt), 
firms can increase their profits by “engineering” a sense of relative deprivation. Moreover, the 
more relative deprivation plays a role in shaping a worker’s utility, the more earnings are 
compressed. These results differ from those obtained by others. For example, rather than 
analyzing social interactions between co-workers, Dur and Glazer (2008) study optimal 
contracts when a worker envies his employer, bearing in mind that his effort contributes to the 
employer’s wealth. Dur and Glazer (2008) conclude that in order to elicit a given level of 
effort from a more envious worker, either the employer has to increase the worker’s base 
salary or bonus salary, or the employer has to relax the effort requirement. In a way, envy is 
an emotion evoked by relative deprivation. In our model, however, when the worker senses 
relative deprivation, the firm could increase his relative deprivation by reducing his wage rate 
while leaving the effort exerted by him unchanged. In addition, Dur and Glazer (2008) find 
                                                 
5 Frank (1985, 19) notes that “people want to be like those they consider above them, they show little evidence 
of wanting to be like those they regard as substantially inferior.” 
6 We neglect the possibility that high income earners are affected by social comparisons from below. However if 
this effect is present, such that workers do not like to earn more than their co-workers, then a counteracting effect 
might prevail as high achievers reduce their effort. As long as the inequality from above impacts more strongly 
than the inequality from below, our main insights will still hold qualitatively. 
7 In our own work (several references are provided in footnote 14 below), we have studied the first three 
responses. 
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that the employer’s profits decline when a worker’s envy increases. We provide conditions 
under which the opposite holds. 
Utilizing a principal-agent model, Fang and Moscarini (2005) consider the effect of 
wage differentiation on the morale of workers, which in turn affects the workers’ incentive to 
exert effort. Morale is affected if workers misjudge their own ability when ability is revealed 
through differentiated wage contracts. Unlike in our model, in the model of Fang and 
Moscarini (2005, 751), workers compare relative earnings “on the perception that they have 
about their own skills.” That is, if the firm’s belief regarding workers’ ability coincides with 
the workers’ perception of their own ability, a relative comparison of earnings will have no 
effect on morale. Fang and Moscarini (2005, 751) distinguish between two possible cases: “If 
effort and ability are complements in production, then workers who suffer a loss in morale are 
discouraged from exerting effort. …The other workers are further encouraged and work 
harder. …If instead effort and ability are substitutes, negative and positive morale effects 
switch places: a loss in morale induces the affected workers to try even harder, to compensate 
the lack of ability; while those who gain morale now believe their natural talent to be 
sufficient for a good performance at lower effort… .” The effect of a loss in morale on effort 
exerted within “the substitution case” in the model of Fang and Moscarini (2005) is akin to 
the effect of the sensing of relative deprivation on the effort extended by a low-productivity 
worker in our model, although we do not consider an effect on the effort supplied by the high-
productivity worker who is not relatively deprived. While in the setting of Fang and 
Moscarini (2005), non-differentiation in wages is applied in order to retain morale, in our 
setting employers should pay wage rates aligned to workers’ levels of productivity and reap 
the ensuing profit returns. 
Earnings compression is often linked to teamwork and is rationalized by its effect of 
reducing non-cooperative behavior (as in tournament models). The earnings compression 
result identified in our model suggests that the feeling of relative deprivation is another reason 
for pay compression. 
Frank (1984a, 1984b, 1985) studies wage determination when status considerations 
matter. Workers who value status highly could gain more status by working for a firm that 
pays a lower wage rate. And those who value status little will accept low-ranking positions if 
paid more than the value of what they produce. “Status payments” lead to earnings 
compression. Nickerson and Zenger (2008) argue that compressed wages can result from the 
actions of management. In a similar vein, Akerlof and Yellen (1990) assume that workers 
have a sense of fairness and reduce their effort if the actual wage falls short of the fair wage. 
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Wage compression occurs when one group receives high payments, and the payments of the 
other groups are adjusted so that the wages of the latter groups are not perceived as unfair. In 
our model, however, wage compression arises when the workers themselves adjust their level 
of effort.  
Our model implies that the workplace layout or configuration is an important arena for 
setting the firms’ profits. When a low-productivity worker senses relative deprivation and 
seeks to quell that feeling by applying more effort at no cost to the firm, the firm may 
“engineer” such a response by positioning the low-productivity worker next to the high-
productivity worker. 
As already noted, workers can take a variety of actions to mitigate an unfavorable 
income gap. Nickerson and Zenger (2008) consider a menu of such actions. When perceived 
inequity arises, the resulting feeling - which Nickerson and Zenger (2008) call “envious 
emotions” - drives workers to reduce effort, depart, engage in sabotage, or withdraw 
cooperation. These actions impose costs on the firm - the “social comparison costs.” In 
response, the management can compress rewards, revise production technologies, or shift 
boundary conditions (for example, by outsourcing tasks). Nickerson and Zenger (2008) 
provide several interesting examples. However, all their illustrations refer to “unfair 
payments:” either one team gets paid more than other teams in the same plant, or there are 
different compensation systems within the same company, or unequal payments for equal 
tasks, or different payments for equal positions. It is hard to deny that in the settings 
illustrated by Nickerson and Zenger (2008), social comparison costs might arise. It seems, 
however, that these settings all refer to inequity. Conceivably, a worker will feel that equity 
holds sway whenever his ratio of inputs (time, effort) to outcomes (wages) is equal to that 
which he perceives pertains to others (Adams 1963). What happens, however, when workers 
compare their rewards with co-workers who earn more, even when inequity does not pervade 
the workplace? As we note below (footnote 11), inequity does not pervade our setting. And 
we employ the concept of relative deprivation which, while encompassing social 
comparisons, is shown to lead to different outcomes from those feared by Nickerson and 
Zenger (2008). In sum, whereas Nickerson and Zenger (2008) emphasize the adverse 
repercussions for the firm of workers’ “engagement” in social comparisons, we identify a 
possible benefit. 
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II. Analysis 
Consider a firm with two workers: a high-productivity worker, s, and a low-
productivity worker, u. The output of a worker, iq , , ,i s u=  depends on ie , the level of effort 
exerted by the worker, and on a quality parameter, iϑ , that converts effort into output. Thus, 
the adjusted-for-quality output of worker i is given by 
 iii eq ϑ= , ,i s u= .  (1) 
To allow for heterogeneity in workers’ productivity, we naturally assume, and without loss of 
generality, that 1=< su ϑϑ : the quality of the output of the high-productivity worker s is 
superior to the quality of the output of the low-productivity worker u. For example, a low-
productivity mushroom harvester collects mushrooms contaminated with soil, while a high-
productivity harvester collects perfectly clean mushrooms. Even if both workers exert the 
same level of effort, say each toils to pick one kilogram of mushrooms, their output adjusted 
for quality differs because “soiled” mushrooms sell for a lower price than clean mushrooms. 
As yet another example, consider salesmen: in a given time span and when negotiating with 
the same number of customers, a low-productivity salesman is likely to conclude fewer sales 
than a high-productivity salesman.  
We study environments in which workers are in close proximity to each other, perform 
comparable tasks, and are aware of the earnings of fellow workers. Output is measurable, and 
a worker’s effort directly affects output. 
 
A. A Baseline Model 
To model a worker’s behavior, we construct a “reaction function” that determines the 
optimal level of effort exerted by a utility maximizing worker for a given wage rate. 8 
Consider a worker i who decides how much effort, ie , to exert for a given wage rate, iw . The 
worker derives utility from earnings (income), ii ew , and disutility from exerting effort. Let 
0>c  be a parameter that converts effort into utility; it measures the intensity of the “pain” or 
displeasure from exerting effort, and is assumed to be the same for both workers. The 
worker’s utility function, v, is given by 9 
 2)( iiiii ceewev −= . (2) 
                                                 
8 In Appendix A we present a more general utility function, and in Appendix B we show that the model 
presented in the body of the paper is equivalent to a model based on a piece rate compensation scheme.  
9 We disregard the worker’s outside option, implicitly assuming that working for the firm dominates not working 
for the firm. 
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We assume that exerting an additional unit of effort when the level of effort is high is worse 
than exerting an additional unit of effort when the level of effort is low. Hence the term .2ie  
Maximization of )( ii ev  yields an optimal level of effort 
 
c
wwe iii
2
)( = . (3) 
Given the reaction function (3), and normalizing the market price of a unit of output as 
one, the profits, π, of the firm that employs the two workers are given by 
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The first order conditions for optimal profit are  
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is negative-definite (minors are 011 <−= cM , and 00
1
22 >−== cHM ). Therefore, π  is 
jointly strictly concave with respect to both wage rates. Consequently, the profit maximizing 
wage rate for the high-productivity worker is uniquely determined as the solution to (5), that 
is, 
 
2
1* =sw , (8) 
and the profit maximizing wage rate for the low-productivity worker is uniquely determined 
as the solution to (6), that is, 
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2
* u
uw
ϑ= . (9) 
The optimal levels of effort exerted by the high-productivity worker and by the low-
productivity worker thus follow from (8) and (9), and are given, respectively, by 
 
c
wee sss 4
1)( ** == , (10) 
and 
 
c
wee uuuu 4
)( ** ϑ== . (11) 
Therefore, the firm’s maximal profits are 
 
ccccc
uuu
8
1
88
1
44
1 222* ϑϑϑπ +=−−+= . (12) 
 
CLAIM 1. The firm’s maximal profits are inversely related to the intensity of the workers’ 
displeasure from exerting effort. 
Proof. 0
8
1
2
2* <+−=∂
∂
cc
uϑπ . □ 
 
Claim 1 implies that firms that provide pleasing working conditions and thereby reduce 
workers’ disutility from exerting effort will reap higher profits compared to firms that provide 
awkward or uninviting working conditions. 
We next compare the earnings of the high-productivity worker with the earnings of the 
low-productivity worker. The earnings gap between the workers, g, is given by 
 
ccc
ewewg uuuuss 8
1
88
1 22***** ϑϑ −=−=−= . (13) 
 
CLAIM 2. When the intensity of the displeasure from exerting effort increases, the earnings 
gap shrinks. 
Proof. 0
8
1
2
2*
<−−=∂
∂
cc
g uϑ , because 12 <uϑ . □ 
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An increase in c reduces the effort level exerted by the high-productivity worker 
relatively more, and because the high-productivity worker’s earnings are higher, the absolute 
decrease in his earnings is bigger than the absolute decrease in the earnings of the low-
productivity worker. This results in a reduced earnings gap.10 This outcome is based on the 
premise that workers are motivated solely by their (material) self interest. We next consider 
the possibility that workers’ behavior is shaped also by interpersonal comparisons. 
 
B. The Baseline Model Augmented by Relative Deprivation (RD) 
The earnings of the low-productivity worker are lower than the earnings of the high- 
productivity worker. Because of this earnings gap (and because of the presumed 
corresponding gap in consumption possibilities), the low-productivity worker may experience 
“relative deprivation,” in which case, in addition to experiencing disutility from the exertion 
of effort, the low-productivity worker derives disutility from the unfavorable comparison of 
his earnings with the earnings of the high-productivity worker.11 Thus, let the utility function 
of the low-productivity worker be 
 2~~~ uuuu ecRDewv −−= α  (14) 
where RD denotes the relative deprivation sensed by a low-productivity worker from 
comparing his earnings with the earnings of the high-productivity worker, and where a tilde 
denotes variables in the RD setting. The coefficient 0>α  determines the weight accorded to 
RD in the utility function of the low-productivity worker.12,13  
It is instructive to briefly explain what the term relative deprivation stands for. A helpful 
way of accomplishing this is to refer to Runciman (1966, 10): “We can roughly say that [a 
person] is relatively deprived of X when (i) he does not have X, (ii) he sees some other person 
or persons, which may include himself at some previous or expected time, as having X 
(whether or not this is or will be in fact the case), (iii) he wants X, and (iv) he sees it as 
                                                 
10 Claim 2 relies on our assumption (made prior to displaying equation (2)) that the displeasure from exerting 
effort of the low-productivity worker is equal to the displeasure from exerting effort of the high-productivity 
worker. Even if this assumption were to be relaxed, that is, even if the displeasure arising from exerting effort of 
the high-productivity worker would be higher than the displeasure arising from exerting effort of the low-
productivity worker, Claim 2 will go through, provided that uϑ  is sufficiently small. 
11 When equity is defined by the ratio of a worker’s input to outcome being the same as that of co-workers, 
inequity does not pervade because from equations (8) through (11) it follows that 
* *
* *
1
2
u s
u s
e e
w w c
= = . 
12 The baseline model can be viewed as a special case of the extended model when 0=α .  
13 How much RD matters depends on a variety of considerations. Frank (1985) underscores the intensity of 
interaction, and our treatment environment measures up to Frank’s (1985, 57) depiction: “in firms in which co-
workers perform their tasks largely independently of one another, one’s rank among one’s co-workers should 
matter less than it does in a firm in which interactions among co-workers are more extensive.” 
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feasible that he should have X.” This succinct exposition of the relative deprivation concept 
also helps define the confines of our analysis: we are interested in studying effort responses, 
and, as already noted, assume away other possible responses such as sabotaging the 
performance of others or investing in skill acquisition. 
Let RD be measured as the proportion of those who earn more (in our case, this 
proportion is ½) times their mean excess income (in our case, this excess income is the 
earnings gap between the workers).14 This formula is derived from a simple definition of the 
concept of relative deprivation. 
Consider a population N of n  individuals whose incomes are 1 2 ... nx x x≤ ≤ ≤ , where 
2n ≥ . The relative deprivation, RD, of an individual whose income is ix , 1,..., 1i n= − , is 
defined as  
 
1
1( ) ( )
n
N i k i
k i
RD x x x
n = +
≡ −∑ ,  
and it is understood that 0)( =nN xRD . Let ( )iF x  be the fraction of those in the population 
whose incomes are smaller than or equal to xi . Let us denote by ik  the smallest [ 1, ]k i n∈ +  
for which k ix x> . That is, ik  is the index of the first individual to the right of xi in the ordered 
distribution whose income is strictly higher than xi. Since for different i’s there can be 
different corresponding k’s, we use the term ik .Then, we have that  
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That is, the relative deprivation of an individual whose income is ix  is the fraction of those in 
the population whose incomes are higher than ix , times their mean excess income. 
                                                 
14 This measure of relative deprivation was proposed by Yitzhaki (1979) and axiomatized by Bossert and 
D’Ambrosio (2006) and Ebert and Moyes (2000) who in turn followed the seminal work of Runciman (1966). 
Since the 1960s, a considerable body of research evolved, demonstrating empirically that interpersonal 
comparisons of income (that is, comparisons of the income of an individual with the incomes of higher income 
members of his reference group) bear significantly on the perception of well-being, and on behavior. (For a 
recent review see Clark et al. 2008). One branch of this body of research has dealt with migration. Several 
studies have shown empirically that a concern for relative deprivation impacts significantly on migration 
outcomes (Stark and Taylor 1989; Stark and Taylor 1991; Quinn 2006; Stark, Micevska, and Mycielski 2009). 
Theoretical expositions have shown how the very decision to resort to migration and the choice of migration 
destination (Stark 1984; Stark and Yitzhaki 1988; Stark and Wang 2007), as well as the assimilation behavior of 
migrants (Fan and Stark 2007), are modified by a distaste for relative deprivation. 
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This RD measure is more concrete than the general concepts of envy and inequity, and 
is more refined than the ordinal measure rank: in an ordered income distribution, for example, 
the RD measure says that given one’s rank, the rank is more unfavorable if those holding 
higher ranks are farther apart, and it records a higher value if the proportion of those to one’s 
right rises, even when their incomes and number do not. (In Appendix C we show that the key 
effort exertion result of our model holds also when a more general measure of RD is 
employed.) Then, assuming that each worker observes fully and accurately the earnings of the 
other worker, the low-productivity worker’s RD is 
 )~~(
2
1
uuss ewewRD −= . (15) 
Inserting (15) into (14) yields 
 2~)~~(
2
~~
uuussuuu ecewewewv −−−= α . (16) 
Maximization of (16) with respect to ue~  yields the optimal level of effort exerted by the low-
productivity worker for a given wage rate: 
 
c
wwe uuu 4
)2()(~ α+= .  (17) 
Because the high-productivity worker senses no relative deprivation, his utility function 
remains as in (2), and his optimal effort level is as in (3), that is, 
 
c
wwe sss
2
)(~ = . (18) 
 
CLAIM 3. The stronger the concern of the low-productivity worker for relative deprivation, 
the higher the increase in the level of effort exerted by the workforce. 
Proof. 0)(
~ =∂
∂
α
ss we , 0
4
)(~ >=∂
∂
c
wwe uuu
α . □ 
 
Holding constant the wage rate of the low-productivity worker, when this worker senses 
relative deprivation, his optimal level of effort increases. This effort response can be seen 
nicely upon decomposing the worker’s effort into two components. From (17), the worker’s 
effort is the effort level as in (3), plus 
c
wu
4
α . This second component represents the 
contribution of relative deprivation to the worker’s effort. What drives the higher effort is an 
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aspiration to narrow the earnings gap and thereby to increase utility. Absent the sensing of 
relative deprivation, the firm would need to increase the wage rate in order to elicit more 
effort. 
Because ),()(~ uuuu wewe >  we can already expect that there will be a corresponding 
increase in profits. For instance, the firm could reduce uw  such that the output of the low-
productivity worker would not change, and thereby also reduce the wage bill for the low-
productivity worker. What wage rates will the firm choose then to maximize its profits? Will 
the earnings gap increase, decrease, or not change at all? To this end, we further investigate 
the firm’s behavior. 
The profit function is 
 
.
4
)2(
24
)2(
2
))(~)(~()(~)(~~
u
u
s
su
u
s
uuusssuuuss
w
c
ww
c
w
c
w
c
w
wwewwewewe
ααϑ
ϑπ
+−−++=
+−+=
 (19) 
The optimal wage rates paid to a high-productivity worker, **sw , and to a low-productivity 
worker, **uw , are determined, respectively, by 
 
c
w
cw
s
s
−=∂
∂
2
1~π , (20) 
and by 
 
c
w
cw
uu
u 2
)2(
4
)2(~ ααϑπ +−+=∂
∂ . (21) 
The Hessian matrix of π~ , given by 
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is negative-definite (minors are 011 <−= cM , and 002
2
22 >−+== cHM
α ). Therefore, π~  is 
jointly strictly concave with respect to both wage rates. Solving for sw  and uw , we obtain, 
respectively, 
  
2
1** =sw , (23) 
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and 
 
2
** u
uw
ϑ= , (24) 
and that the corresponding levels of effort exerted are 
 
c
wee sss 4
1)(~ **** == , (25) 
and 
 
c
wee uuuu 8
)2()(~ **** αϑ +== . (26) 
By comparing (24) with (9), we see that when the low-productivity worker senses and 
responds to relative deprivation, the firm will elect not to reduce the wage rate of the low-
productivity worker (nor, for that matter, to increase the wage rate of the low-productivity 
worker). 
The profits of the profit-maximizing firm when the low-productivity worker senses 
relative deprivation, **RDπ , are given by 
 
ccccc
uuu
RD 16
)2(2
16
)2(
8
1
8
)2(
4
1 222** αϑαϑαϑπ ++=+−−++= . (27) 
 
CLAIM 4. The firm’s optimal profits are higher the stronger the concern of the low-
productivity worker for relative deprivation. 
Proof. 0
16
2**
>=∂
∂
c
uRD ϑ
α
π . □ 
 
Because 0>α  then, from comparing (17) and (3) while bearing in mind from (24) and 
(9) that the low-productivity worker’s wage rate does not change, an increase in profits is 
apparent; when low-productivity workers become more “productive” for a given wage rate, 
the firm benefits. Comparing (27) and (12) reveals that when the low-productivity worker 
senses relative deprivation, the firm’s profits increase by 
 
ccc
uuu
RD 168
1
16
)2(2 222*** αϑϑαϑππ =+−++=− . (28) 
From (28) we can infer that holding the wage rates intact, a gain in profits could come about 
from a lower c, or from (the presence of, and thereby) a higher α . This result is informative 
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when tinkering with c can be done only to a little extent or is quite costly, whereas affecting 
relative deprivation by a redesign of the workplace aimed at intensifying cross-worker 
comparisons could be relatively easy. When the technology of production allows teamwork, 
our model suggests employing mixed-productivity teams. In a different setting, the firm could 
place a low-productivity worker and a high-productivity worker in the same office. 
Furthermore, wages of (co-)workers can be made public.  
We next consider RDg , the earnings gap within the framework of the augmented model. 
We get that when RD matters, 
 
ccc
weweg uuuussRD 16
)2(2
16
)2(
8
1 22********** αϑαϑ +−=+−=−= . (29) 
To ensure that we will never end up with a negative gap between the earnings of the high-
productivity worker and the earnings of the low-productivity worker (thereby rendering the 
high-productivity worker relatively deprived) or, for that matter, with a negative gap between 
the output of the high-productivity worker and the output of the low-productivity worker, we 
assume that 222 −<
uϑα . 
 
CLAIM 5. The earnings gap is lower the more relative deprivation “counts.” 
Proof. 0
16
2**
<−=∂
∂
c
g uRD ϑ
α . □ 
 
Claim 5 shows that the sensing of relative deprivation gives rise to compressed 
earnings: the effect of the joint behavior of the “dismayed” low-productivity worker and the 
firm on the inequality in the distribution of earnings within the firm is to reduce the 
inequality. Because low-productivity workers might sense relative deprivation in diverse 
intensities, earnings are more compressed the more relative deprivation plays a role in a 
worker’s utility. This can also be inferred by looking at the effect of α  on the change in the 
earnings gap. This change is given by 
 0
1616
22
16
)2(2 222*** <−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−=−
ccc
gg uuuRD
αϑϑαϑ , (30) 
which tells us that a higher α  gives rise to a larger decrease in the earnings gap. 
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In summary, our model suggests that in the presence of a concern for relative 
deprivation, the inequality in the intra-firm distribution of earnings is lower, and the firm’s 
profits are higher. 
 
III. Discussion: the Paper that is Closest to Ours 
Cabrales et al. (2008) study the earnings structure in a model in which workers have 
social preferences. They define the individual’s reference group as consisting of people who 
work in the same firm and who have had similar career histories within the firm. Cabrales et 
al. (2008, 67) maintain that “in the absence of frictions and with social preferences, …, firms 
hire only from one skill pool.” When considering social preferences and social friction, the 
firm can either increase wages to compensate for unskilled workers’ disutility, or segregate 
skills. Like Cabrales et al. (2008), we assume that the individual’s reference group consists of 
people in the immediate vicinity - in our case, co-workers. Neither we nor Cabrales et al. 
(2008) consider “status:” having a higher income than others does not confer utility. Taking 
into account social preferences, individuals derive disutility if they earn less than other 
individuals within their reference group. 
There is no reason for productivity segregation in our model; on the contrary, firms 
have an incentive to match high-productivity and low-productivity workers, because low-
productivity workers apply more effort than when employed by themselves. Firms reap gains 
they do not have to pay for through higher wage rates, so firms benefit from employing a 
mixed pool of workers. We show that the incorporation of social preferences and the 
associated behavioral response leads to increases in earnings for some workers. Cabrales et al. 
(2008, 73) do not take into account the effect of social preferences on the effort exerted by the 
“lower types,” and they explicitly leave out the choice of the level of effort, noting that this is 
“something that is beyond the scope of this paper.” Thus, our analysis complements the 
analysis of Cabrales et al. (2008) because in our model, workers explicitly choose the level of 
effort (that is, the choice of the level of effort is endogenous). Thus, what Cabrales et al. 
(2008) term a wage increase unrelated to productivity may simply reflect the higher level of 
effort exerted by the low-productivity workers, as suggested by our analysis. 
Like Cabrales et al. (2008), we find that social concerns bring about a compression of 
earnings. However, the underlying mechanism differs, because in our case an increase in 
earnings induced by relative deprivation is the crucial factor. Cabrales et al. (2008) also find 
that wages are downwardly flexible. In their model, workers’ earnings decrease if firms pay 
 16
less. In our model, workers’ earnings will decrease endogenously, for example, when the 
high-productivity worker leaves the firm. 
 
 
IV. Implications, Limitations, and Supplementary Evidence 
A. Implications 
Taking a cue from the literature on mechanism design, we ask: if the firm’s desired 
outcome is to maximize profit, what mechanism could the firm design (which architecture of 
the workplace could the firm select) to attain that outcome? The workplace layout or 
configuration is an important arena for shaping the firm’s profit. Consider a duty-free store 
layout (or, for that matter, the layout of any retail store) with two entrances, a cashier at each 
entrance, and a pay structure based on the value of the sales generated by the cashier. Our 
model predicts that the positioning of the two cashiers will impact on the level of effort that 
they will exert and thereby, and in a well-predicted way, on the store’s profits. If one entrance 
is sealed off and the two cashiers are assigned to work next to each other, the less able cashier 
will feel relative deprivation and will therefore increase his or her effort. If both are equally 
able, pairing them will affect neither effort nor profit. 
Our model has an interesting implication for the productivity profile of a firm’s new 
hires. Suppose that the firm seeks to expand its production, and to this end considers hiring 
additional workers. And suppose that the firm is pleased to learn what we have pointed out in 
Section II of the paper. When RD matters (and is defined as in Section II. B.), the hiring of an 
additional low-productivity worker (or even very low-productivity worker) will lower the 
optimal level of effort supplied by the incumbent low-productivity worker because the 
proportion of high-productivity worker(s) in the firm’s workforce will decline from one half 
to one third. The converse holds if the firm hires a high-productivity worker: the optimal 
effort supplied by the low-productivity worker will rise. If the firm seeks to expand its 
production while retaining the prevailing incentives intact, and if that expansion requires input 
of low-productivity workers, the firm may just as well outsource. It follows then that by 
retaining an environment which encourages the desired level of effort, outsourcing is more 
likely when the additional operations are low productivity intensive than when they are high 
productivity intensive. 
Assume that there are two similar firms with equal distributions of workers’ 
productivities, except that one firm, the N firm, employs only natives whereas the other firm, 
the NM firm, employs natives as well as migrants. Suppose that natives compare themselves 
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with each other, and that migrants compare themselves with other migrants, but not with 
natives. Because low-productivity natives compare themselves with high-productivity natives, 
our model predicts that earnings will be compressed in firm N. If, overall, migrants are less 
productive than natives that is, if migrants are the low-productivity workers in firm NM, and 
if migrants compare themselves only with other migrants (and therefore, do not sense as much 
relative deprivation as the low-productivity natives in firm N), our model predicts that there 
will be less earnings compression (or more earnings stretching) in the NM firm (cf. Claim 5). 
That the earnings of migrants within firm NM are lower than the earnings of comparable (in 
terms of levels of productivity) native workers in firm N, is not then the outcome of anti-
migrant discrimination. As a corollary, and as implied by Claim 4, if at no extra cost a firm 
can obtain a higher profit by eliciting more effort from low-productivity native workers than 
from low-productivity migrants, the firm will prefer to hire the former. This preference arises, 
though, from cool economic considerations, not from diehard discrimination. A similar 
consideration could apply to US settings in which the N firm employs only whites, whereas 
the NM firm employs whites as well as blacks. 
 
B. Limitations 
The technology of production impacts on the extent to which output is team-produced, 
on the spatial proximity of workers, and on the intensity with which workers interact 
(Nickerson and Zenger 2008). The configuration of the firm as dictated by the production 
technology shapes the social comparisons space. The social architecture, in turn, affects the 
cost of accessing information about peers’ performance and their productivity. For instance, 
workers who are in close proximity and perform similar tasks are likely to identify each other 
as members of their reference group and compare their earnings with each other (Nickerson 
and Zenger 2008). Merely by reducing the physical distance between workers, management 
can increase interaction and information sharing. Choosing a production technology that 
departs from the most efficient production technology in order to increase relative deprivation 
can impose its own cost, however. If this effect is operative, it diminishes the increase in 
profits predicted by our model. Furthermore, the precision with which individuals can 
measure their own performance as well as the performance of others will affect our outcome. 
Again, from the perspective of management, difficulties in measuring individual performance, 
for example in team production, reduce the effectiveness of strategies to increase effort, when 
(due to these same difficulties) such an increase in effort is not rewarded by an increase in 
earnings. 
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Our model is more likely to hold when recognition, evaluation, and remuneration of 
performance are fairly easy. In variance with our model, the more wages are based on 
performance standards determined by the peer group, the stronger the incentive to undermine 
co-workers, as is also the case when rewards are based on relative performance. Under the 
assumptions of our model, a tournament structure may not lead to an increase in effort when 
the probability of promotion of high-productivity workers is higher than the probability of 
promotion of low-productivity workers. And when output strongly depends on luck and the 
receipt of promotion is a pure game of chance, workers of both types might withdraw effort. 
In the environment modeled by us, there is tension between the preferences of low- 
productivity workers, and the preferences of firms: low-productivity workers will not like to 
be teamed up with high-productivity workers, because such a matching will inflict relative 
deprivation; firms will want to pool together low-productivity workers with high-productivity 
workers precisely for this very same reason, because the response to the ensuing relative 
deprivation will increase profits. In our analysis, we have disregarded the worker’s outside 
option, or exit. If low-productivity workers can exercise free choice, they will seek to avoid 
working together with high-productivity workers: absent frictions, low-productivity workers 
will prefer complete segregation. In a competitive labor market, all firms will prefer to 
employ only high-productivity workers. Since the workforce is heterogeneous, some firms 
will end up employing (only) low-productivity workers, as long as profits are yielded. 
According to our model, by employing a mixed pool of workers, firms stand to reap profits 
that they do not have to pay for. Firms employing low-productivity workers have an incentive 
to employ high-productivity workers. These firms will be willing to pay wages above the 
market-clearing level to attract high-productivity workers. Therefore, if we allow both 
competition and some friction, our basic argument can still hold. 
 
C. Supplementary Evidence 
Although we have not conducted a controlled experiment to measure the signs and 
elasticities of the effects highlighted by our model, we can nonetheless enlist evidence 
garnered from the empirical analyses of others that appears to align with the predictions of our 
model.  
Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan (2003) found that the adoption of teams in a garment 
factory increased productivity, on average, by 14 percent, and that more heterogeneous teams 
were more productive than teams of the same average ability. Hamilton et al. (2003) also 
report that when the team structure was first introduced, the teams attracted the relatively 
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high-productivity workers. To the extent that the insights obtained in our analysis of a two-
worker firm could be applied to multiple-worker firms, we would have predicted that 
behavior: because a low-productivity worker would sense relative deprivation on joining a 
team of high-productivity workers, he would not be keen to join the team if he did not have 
to. Hamilton et al. (2003, 493) report one more result: “high-ability workers appear to 
improve team productivity more than low-ability workers do.” If the most able team member 
is replaced by a still higher-ability individual, all other members of the team would sense 
heightened relative deprivation and increase their effort. If the least able team member is 
replaced by a more able individual who still remains the least able team member, no other 
team member will be exposed, as a consequence, to more relative deprivation and, as long as 
the wage rate paid to the least productive worker remains unchanged, the supply of effort will 
not change either. If, following the replacement of the least able team member by a slightly 
more able worker, the wage rate of the marginally more productive, new least able worker is 
increased in recognition of this worker’s higher productivity, the supply of effort of the two-
worker team will increase. To see this, we revisit equation (26). Because 
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ϑ ,  (32) 
it follows that the team’s supply of effort will increase. 
Similar support for the predictions of our model can be found in Falk and Ichino (2006). 
In a controlled field experiment they obtain evidence that peer effects raise overall average 
productivity, and that low-productivity workers are more influenced by peers than high-
productivity workers. This is in line with our model assumption that the low-productivity 
worker but not the high-productivity worker is influenced by the consideration of relative 
deprivation. Falk and Ichino (2006) conclude that output maximizing firms should mix low 
and high-productivity workers rather than group together workers of similar levels of 
productivity. 
Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2010) sought to unravel how workers’ social ties in the 
workplace affect performance. Drawing on data from a farm that employs fruit harvesters 
who are paid a piece rate per kilogram of picked fruit, Bandiera et al. (2010) find that the 
productivity of less able workers increases significantly when working alongside more 
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productive co-workers with whom the less able workers interact socially, as compared to 
working alongside co-workers who are not part of the less able workers’ social network. 
Using our terminology, the former co-workers constitute the reference group of the less able 
workers, whereas the latter do not. The firm is reported to benefit from the prevalence of 
socially-based incentives.  
Mas and Moretti (2009) study peer effects in the workplace. They investigate how the 
productivity of a worker is affected by the productivity of co-workers. Using scanner data 
from a large supermarket chain, they find strong evidence of productivity spillovers 
associated with the introduction of highly productive workers into a shift. The productivity of 
the high-productivity workers is not affected by the presence of low-productivity workers, 
however. This aligns with our basic idea that incentives arise from looking up (to the right), 
not down (to the left). Furthermore, productivity increases when the highly productive 
workers are those with whom the workers interact frequently. This too is in line with our basic 
concept of a reference (or comparison) group. It is hard, however, to tell what exactly runs 
through workers’ minds when they tune up their effort - whether the motive is as postulated 
by us (a desire to curtail relative deprivation) or an aspiration not to sense shame from trailing 
behind others. The findings of Mas and Moretti (2009) suggest that an optimal organization of 
the workplace ought to recognize the benefits from mixing different levels of productivity 
(“engineering” a variance in productivities). 
Osterman (2006) finds that High Performance Work Organization (innovative work 
systems such as teams, quality programs, and job rotation) has a positive impact on wages for 
core blue-collar manufacturing employees, even after controlling for education. Our model 
suggests a mechanism that explains why this happens. 
 
V. Conclusion 
How and when can a reconfiguration of the workplace increase a firm’s profits 
without the firm changing its wage rates? We developed the following line of reasoning. 
Taking into account social preferences, we postulated that workers derive disutility when they 
earn less than fellow workers. Sensing relative deprivation affects the optimal level of effort 
chosen by a worker. Relative deprivation motivates a low-productivity worker to close the 
earnings gap with a high-productivity worker, and this is achieved by exerting a higher level 
of effort. The increase in the level of effort is not the result of an increase in the wage rate for 
the low-productivity worker, as would have been implied by the baseline model. We point to 
a novel way of inducing workers who are relatively less productive to exert more effort. We 
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also show that the more relative deprivation plays a role in shaping a low-productivity 
worker’s utility, the more earnings are compressed. Our model predicts that the worker’s 
sense of relative deprivation and consequent response will have a positive effect on the firm’s 
profits. 
 
Appendix A  
Modifying the Utility Function 
Our results hold when in the utility function displayed in equation (2) we replace the 
coefficient 2 with any number 1n > . Namely, if instead of 
 2)( iiiii ceewev −=  (2) 
we were to use the utility function 
 niiiii ceewev −=)( , 1n >  (A1) 
then we would derive qualitatively exactly the same results as when using (2). 
 
Appendix B 
A Piece Rate Compensation Scheme 
It can be shown that we will derive the very same results as those of our baseline 
model and of our augmented model when instead of an hourly wage scheme, a piece rate 
compensation scheme is in place. 
Consider once again a firm with two workers: a high-productivity worker, s, and a low-
productivity worker, u. The output of a worker, iq , , ,i s u=  depends on ie , the level of effort 
exerted by the worker, and on a quality parameter, iϑ , that converts effort into output. Thus, 
the adjusted-for-quality output (the produced goods, or the sales) of worker i is given by 
 iii eq ϑ= , , .i s u=  (B1) 
To allow for heterogeneity in workers’ productivities, we assume, that 1=< su ϑϑ .  
 
I. A Baseline Model 
Consider a worker i who decides how much effort, ie , to exert for a given piece rate, 
w . The worker derives utility from earnings (income), iiewϑ , and disutility from exerting 
effort. Let 0>c , a parameter that converts effort into (dis)utility, be the same for both 
workers. The worker’s utility function, v, is given by  
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 2)( iiiii ceewev −= ϑ . (B2) 
Maximization of )( ii ev  yields an optimal level of effort 
 ( )
2
i
i
we w
c
ϑ= . (B3) 
Given the reaction function (B3), and normalizing the market price of a unit of output as 
one, the profits, π, of the firm that employs the two workers are given by 
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The first order condition for optimal profit is 
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Because 0
1 22 <+−=∂∂
∂
cww
uϑπ , the profit maximizing wage rate for both workers is uniquely 
determined as the solution to (B5), that is, 
 
2
1* =w . (B6) 
The optimal levels of effort exerted by the high-productivity worker and by the low-
productivity worker thus follow from (A7), and are given, respectively, by 
 * * 1( )
4s s
e e w
c
= = , (B7) 
and 
 * *( )
4
u
u ue e w c
ϑ= = . (B8) 
Therefore, the firm’s maximal profits are 
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just the same as in (12). 
Correspondingly, the earnings gap between the workers, g, is given by 
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which is the same as (13). 
 
 
II. The Piece Rate Compensation Scheme Baseline Model Augmented by Relative 
Deprivation (RD) 
As before, let RD be measured as the proportion of those who earn more, times their 
mean excess income. Then, 
 1 ( )
2 s u u
RD we w eϑ= −  . (B11) 
Expanding (B2) to incorporate (B11) yields 
 2~)~~(
2
~~
uuusuuu ecewewewv −−−= ϑαϑ . (B12) 
Maximization of (B12) with respect to ue~  yields the optimal level of effort exerted by the 
low-productivity worker for a given piece rate: 
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ϑ α+= .  (B13) 
Because the high-productivity worker senses no relative deprivation, his utility function 
is as in (B2), and his optimal effort level is as in (B3), namely  
 ( )
2s
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c
= . (B14) 
The profit function is 
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The optimal wage rate paid to a high-productivity worker and to a low-productivity worker is 
determined by 
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. (B16) 
Solving for ,w  we obtain 
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and the corresponding levels of effort exerted are 
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and 
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The profits of the profit-maximizing firm when the low-productivity worker senses 
relative deprivation, **RDπ , are given by 
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We next consider RDg , the earnings gap within the framework of the model augmented 
by RD. We get 
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Because we derive the same solutions for ********** ,,,,,, RDusus eegee ππ , and **RDg  as in 
Section II, Claims 1-5 do not change. 
 
Appendix C 
A General Form of Relative Deprivation (RD) 
That the sensing of RD will increase the level of effort exerted by a low-productivity 
worker can be shown to hold even in a fairly general model. We are able to draw several 
conclusions (for example, that profits will increase), in line with the conclusions drawn in the 
model presented in the body of the paper even when RD is measured heuristically. However, 
with the “general form” we cannot construct a reaction function, so we do not know how 
exactly the firm will react. 
 
I. A Basic General Model 
Consider the same setting as before: let there be two workers, a high-productivity 
worker, s, and a low-productivity worker, u. Let each worker’s earnings, ( )i iE e , usi ,= , be a 
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function of the worker’s effort, ie , where 0)( >′ ii eE  and 0)( ≤′′ ii eE . Let the cost of extending 
this effort be )( ii eC , where 0)( >′ ii eC  and 0)( >′′ ii eC . The worker’s utility function, iv , is 
given by 
 )()()( iiiiii eCeEev −= , usi ,= . (C1) 
The decision problem of the worker is how much effort to exert. The first order 
condition for a maximum of (C1) is 
 0)()( =′−′ iiii eCeE , (C2) 
We denote the solutions to (C2) by *se  and 
*
ue . 
We assume that the high-productivity worker is more productive and therefore 
receives higher earnings no matter how much effort the low-productivity worker exerts: 
eeEeE us ∀> )()(  and )()( ** uuss eEeE > . We denote the high-productivity worker’s earnings 
by )( *sss eEE ≡ .  
 
II. Augmenting the Basic General Model by Relative Deprivation 
Because the low-productivity worker receives lower earnings than the high-
productivity worker, he derives (dis)utility also from an unfavourable comparison of his 
earnings with the earnings of the high-productivity worker. RD denotes the relative 
deprivation arising from earnings comparisons, and is defined as follows 
 )),(( suu EeERDRD ≡ , (C3) 
such that ,0
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RD E e E
E
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Combining (C1) and (C3) we have that 
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We can rewrite the utility function of a low-productivity worker to reflect his concern 
for RD: 
 )()),(()()( uusuuuuuu eCEeERDeEev −−= α , (C5) 
where α  is the weight that this worker attaches to RD. 
The optimally chosen level of effort, ,**ue  is given by 
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We assume that the second order condition for a maximum, 0)( ** <′′ uu ev , holds. This requires 
that 
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α . 
 
CLAIM C1. The sensing of relative deprivation increases the level of effort exerted: *** uu ee > . 
Proof. We prove this claim by contradiction. Suppose otherwise, that is, suppose that *** uu ee ≤ . 
Because 0)( >′ uu eC , 0)( >′′ uu eC , 0)( >′ uu eE , and 0)( ≤′′ uu eE , we have that 
 0)()()()( ****** =′−′≥′−′ uuuuuuuu eCeEeCeE , (C7) 
and because 0
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e
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 we have that 
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which contradicts (C6). □ 
 
CLAIM C2. A higher coefficient α  - an increase in the weight that the low-productivity 
worker attaches to RD in his utility function - elicits a higher level of effort by the low-
productivity worker. 
Proof. Because from (C6), 
 0
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u , (C9) 
we have that 
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where Ω , the derivative of the left hand side of (C6) with respect to e is simply the second 
order condition, and hence it must be negative at the optimum. □ 
 
Because *** uu ee > , we can already expect that there will be a corresponding increase in 
profits. The incentive to exert effort yielded by a concern for relative deprivation could 
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substitute for the wage as a tool aimed at eliciting effort. Consequently, a firm with an RD- 
sensitive worker could cut wages without hurting profits.  
 
References 
Adams, Stacy J. 1963. Toward an understanding of inequity. Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology 67, no. 5:422-36. 
Akerlof, George A. 1982. Labor contracts as partial gift exchange. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 97, no. 4:543-69. 
Akerlof, George A., and Janet L. Yellen. 1990. The fair wage-effort hypothesis and 
unemployment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, no. 2:255-83. 
Bandiera, Oriana, Iwan Barankay, and Imran Rasul. 2010. Social incentives in the workplace. 
Review of Economic Studies 77, no. 2:417-58. 
Becker, Gary S. 1957. The economics of discrimination. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Bossert, Walter, and Conchita D’Ambrosio. 2006. Reference groups and individual 
deprivation: an axiomatic characterization of Yitzhaki’s index of individual 
deprivation. Economics Letters 90, no. 3:421-6. 
Bull, Clive, Andrew Schotter, and Keith Weigelt. 1987. Tournaments and piece rates: an 
experimental study. Journal of Political Economy 95, no. 1:1-33. 
Cabrales, Antonio, Antoni Calvó-Armengol, and Nicola Pavoni. 2008. Social preferences, 
skill segregation, and wage dynamics. Review of Economic Studies 75, no. 1:65-98. 
Clark, Andrew E., Paul Frijters, and Michael A. Shields. 2008. Relative income, happiness, 
and utility: An explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and other puzzles. Journal of 
Economic Literature 46, no. 1:95-144. 
Dur, Robert, and Amihai Glazer. 2008. Optimal contracts when a worker envies his boss. 
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 24, no. 1:120-37. 
Ebert, Udo, and Patrick Moyes. 2000. An axiomatic characterization of Yitzhaki’s index of 
individual deprivation. Economics Letters 68, no. 3:263-70. 
 28
Falk, Armin, and Andrea Ichino. 2006. Clean evidence on peer effects. Journal of Labor 
Economics 24, no. 1:39-58. 
Fan, Simon C., and Oded Stark. 2007. A social proximity explanation of the reluctance to 
assimilate. Kyklos 60, no. 1:55-63. 
Fang, Hanming, and Giuseppe Moscarini. 2005. Morale hazard. Journal of Monetary 
Economics 52, no. 4:749-77. 
Festinger, Leon. 1954. A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations 7, no. 
2:117-40. 
Frank, Robert H. 1984a. Are workers paid their marginal products? American Economic 
Review 74, no. 4:549-71.  
Frank, Robert H. 1984b. Interdependent preferences and the competitive wage structure. Rand 
Journal of Economics 15, no. 4:510-20.  
Frank, Robert H. 1985. Choosing the right pond: Human behavior and the quest for status. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Hamilton, Barton H., Jack A. Nickerson, and Hideo Owan. 2003. Team incentives and worker 
heterogeneity: An empirical analysis of the impact of teams on productivity and 
participation. Journal of Political Economy 111, no. 3:465-97. 
Knight, John, Lina Song, and Ramani Gunatilaka. 2007. Subjective well-being and its 
determinants in Rural China. Economics Series Working Papers no. 334, University of 
Oxford. 
Lazear, Edward P., and Sherwin Rosen. 1981. Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor 
contracts. Journal of Political Economy 89, no. 5:841-64. 
Levine, David I. 1991. Cohesiveness, productivity and wage dispersion. Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization 15, no. 2:237-55. 
Mas, Alexandre, and Enrico Moretti. 2009. Peers at work. American Economic Review 99, no. 
1:112-45. 
 29
Nickerson, Jack A., and Todd R. Zenger. 2008. Envy, comparison costs, and the economic 
theory of the firm. Strategic Management Journal 29, no. 13:1429-50. 
Osterman, Paul. 2006. The wage effects of high performance work organization in 
manufacturing. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 59, no. 2:187-204. 
Quinn, Michael A. 2006. Relative deprivation, wage differentials and Mexican migration. 
Review of Development Economics 10, no. 1:135-53. 
Rosen, Sherwin. 1986. Prizes and incentives in elimination tournaments. American Economic 
Review 76 , no. 4:701-15. 
Runciman, Walter G. 1966. Relative deprivation and social justice: A study of attitudes to 
social inequality in twentieth-century England. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Schelling, Thomas C. 1971. Dynamic models of segregation. Journal of Mathematical 
Sociology 1, no. 2:143-86. 
Stark, Oded. 1984. Rural-to-urban migration in LDCs: A relative deprivation approach. 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 32 , no. 3:475-86. 
Stark, Oded, Maja Micevska, and Jerzy Mycielski. 2009. Relative poverty as a determinant of 
migration: evidence from Poland. Economics Letters 103, no. 3:119-22. 
Stark, Oded, and Edward J. Taylor. 1989. Relative deprivation and international migration. 
Demography 26, no. 1:1-14. 
Stark, Oded, and Edward J. Taylor. 1991. Migration incentives, migration types: the role of 
relative deprivation. Economic Journal 101, no. 408:1163-78. 
Stark, Oded, and You Qiang Wang. 2007. Towards a theory of self-segregation as a response 
to relative deprivation: steady-state outcomes and social welfare. In Economics and 
Happiness: Framing the Analysis, ed. Luigino Bruni and Pier Luigi Porta.  Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Stark, Oded, and Shlomo Yitzhaki. 1988. Labour migration as a response to relative 
deprivation. Journal of Population Economics 1, no. 1:57-70. 
 30
Veblen, Thorstein. 1899. The Theory of the Leisure Class. Reprints of Economic Classics. 
New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1965. 
Yitzhaki, Shlomo. 1979. Relative deprivation and the Gini coefficient. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 93, no. 2:321-4. 
 
